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Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: Promoting creative
industries while maintaining political control
November 30, 2011 in Op-Ed by The China Beat
By Thomas Glucksmann-Smith
On October 15-18th 2011 during the latest Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee,
China’s leaders discussed ways to make China a ‘culturally strong nation’ (文化强国) and
defined strategies to enhance China’s international soft power. This meeting coincided with tax
evasion charges laid against China’s world renowned artist Ai Weiwei—charges he now plans to
challenge.
Ai Weiwei, recently described by Art Review as the ‘world’s most powerful artist’ would, in any
other nation, be regarded as a perfect diplomat for his country’s cultural industries. But, for
China’s CCP leaders Mr Ai’s political activism and provocative behaviour has gone too far.
Despite being responsible for the design of the Beijing Olympic Bird’s Nest stadium he is now
subject to surveillance and travel restrictions.
The heavy-handed treatment of such an influential artist hinders China’s global image as an
aspiring leader in the arena of cultural and artistic production. It runs directly counter to the
international agenda for the cultural initiatives proposed at the recent sixth plenary session.
Popular blogger Han Han (韩寒) exposed the contradiction in the Central Committee’s policy,
writing at his blog on November 2nd 2011: “Even I, as a player in the world of culture, don’t
know how to write about building a culturally strong nation. So how can the members of the
Polit-bureau who block search results for Li Bai on google, devise a plan to build a culturally
strong nation?” This blog post has subsequently been removed as part of the regular censorial
sweep.
The plan was unveiled at the Plenary Session, which designated the cultural industries as a pillar
of the national economy. China’s leaders are experimenting with various forms of ownership
structure in order to advance technological and cultural innovation. They hope that marketproduced cultural goods can be consumed domestically and exported abroad, while state organs
will continue to have responsibility for providing essential public cultural goods and services.
To achieve their desired global cultural impact China’s leaders identified four key areas in the
cultural industries sector that need to be improved: research in philosophy and social sciences,
the reputation of Chinese news media, the quality of literary and artistic works, and the
development of a ‘healthy’ online culture (发展健康向上的网络文化). Yet, the recent
detentions of global cultural icons like Ai Weiwei and Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo suggests
that the CCP’s impulse will be to keep control over the content of these new, improved cultural
products. Old socialist cultural work habits die hard.
And where does socialism fit in within the domestic and international soft power push?

In an opinion article in the People’s Daily, Ren Zhongping addresses the issue of promoting
Chinese-style socialism in order to legitimise China’s claims to a society that endorses
‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. This point was heavily discussed at the meeting, with
calls for a reintroduction of Marxist values in education and the need to disseminate Chinese
socialism internationally. However, the banner of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ will
certainly render China unsuccessful in its bid to exert soft power internationally and may well
fall flat with domestic audiences too. Socialism as a political and cultural brand no longer carries
the cache it once did to either audience.
Moreover, the notion of promoting an ideology with distinctly “Chinese characteristics” runs
counter to the global operation of soft power as outlined by Joseph Nye (2004). According to
Nye, success in exercising soft power involves the promotion of values and norms that have
universal appeal and transcend cultural boundaries.
Yee-Kwang Heng (2010) uses this point to illustrate the disparity in soft power between China
and Japan since the latter’s government has been capitalizing on the popularity of its cultural
goods in the international arena. Heng explains that Japanese anime and manga appeal to many
people around the world as they offer culturally neutral characters, locations and narratives.
Recent widely distributed Chinese films such as Fearless (霍元甲, 2006) and Ip Man (叶问,
2008) only offer non-Chinese audiences the spectacle of kung fu, since the narratives and
settings are too culturally specific, xenophobic, nationalistic and lack the requisite levels of
creativity for universal appeal.
Heng also places Japan at the forefront of global environmental protection and climate change
research—a sphere that has international appeal and has consequently boosted the nation’s soft
power. So far China is infamous for its urban air pollution and rural environmental degradation
as a result of local corruption, despite efforts by the state to promote conservation and alternative
energy resources.
Regardless of these current deficiencies, Ren Zhongping celebrates the success of China’s
cultural achievements, claiming that the country’s cultural sector has entered a “golden period of
development” (黄金发展期). Ren cites the fact that China is the world’s third
largest film producer, the number one TV producer and the largest publisher of books. But the
reality is that very few Chinese movies make any significant box office gains, Chinese TV is
succumbing to greater government controls on content, Chinese News Media are propaganda
devices and books are frequently banned in China on political or moral grounds.
Concerning soft power, Ren draws attention to the spread of Chinese culture internationally
using the example of the 350 Confucius Institutes overseas and calls this the dawn of a “Chinese
Cultural renaissance” (复兴曙光). Nevertheless, these Confucius Institutes require close scrutiny
since some have been accused of interfering in the academic activities of universities on Taiwan
and Tibet related issues. The fact that these Confucius Institutes claim to promote traditional
Chinese culture under the auspices of the Communist government is not without irony,
considering the anti-Confucian legacy of Mao and the Cultural Revolution (Louie, 2011).

The PRC leaders’ claims to exclusive rights to ‘represent’ Chinese culture have also been long
contested. Harvard academic Tu Wei-Ming argued in 1991 that the Chinese in Taiwan,
Singapore and other diaspora communities have a greater claim to represent cultural China and
to uphold the dignity of Chinese civilization than the brutal Marxist-totalitarian state. Tu’s
later activities in China suggest that he may be rethinking this position—although his
reconciliation with China may reflect the nation’s economic might rather than the effectiveness
of its soft power.
With rampant consumerism and the relentless pursuit of material wealth apparent in China today
it is hard to believe that promoting Marxist values or Chinese socialism will find broad traction
among domestic audiences. Moreover, the success of Chinese culture abroad will need to be
assessed across many dimensions that include the consumption of market produced cultural
goods, the sources of Chinese cultural production and the way in which Chinese cultural
discourse evolves beyond the control of ethnically Chinese communities. Examining the number
of Confucius Institutes and the statistics for foreigners learning Chinese does not indicate the
current success of Chinese soft power. Instead we could start by counting the number of people
who visited Ai Weiwei’s exhibit at the Tate Modern.
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